By Dawn Zoldi
On March 24, fifteen Ceres Air C31 agricultural spraying drones, each the size of an ATV, each capable of dispersing 40 gallons of liquid across a 15-mile span in under seven minutes, vanished from a logistics facility in Harrison, New Jersey. The FBI opened an investigation into potential weaponization. It was, by any measure, the type of potential nightmare scenario that C-UAS practitioners have long warned about. The story broke publicly after a panel of New Jersey’s most experienced counter-drone professionals gathered at Shore to Soar in Cape May County to deliver some hard-earned lessons learned.
The “CUAS in the New Regulatory Paradigm” session featured Brett McCormick of the New Jersey State Police, Michael DiGenni of the New Jersey Department of Corrections, Charlie Ambio of the New Jersey Office of Homeland Security and Preparedness, Jason Osborne a Federal Air Marshal and Dave Krause of Influential Drones. Their message, built on years of operational experience, carries direct implications for agencies and operators working in this space, as well as manufacturers and integrators.
Detection First, Mitigation Last
Perhaps the most important distinction the panel drew is also the most frequently misunderstood in industry circles. C-UAS is not primarily about taking down aircraft. It starts with awareness.
For context, under the SAFER Skies Act (2026), federal authorities have been enhanced, granting the Department of Homeland Security and Department of Justice expanded powers to take counter-UAS actions necessary to enforce the law and protect the public. Certified State, local, Tribal, and territorial law enforcement and correctional agencies are also empowered to use authorized counter-UAS technologies to mitigate credible drone threats, provided they complete federally coordinated training and certification with DHS and DOJ. This marks a significant expansion from prior law, which restricted such authorities to select federal agencies (SAFER Skies Act, Sec. 2(a)(1), 2(a)(2), 2(d)(2), 2(d)(2)(C)).
But agencies deploying detection systems need to answer a sequence of questions before any intervention is justified:
- Is a drone present?
- Where is it operating?
- Where might the operator be?
- Is the flight authorized?
- Is the activity careless, clueless, or criminal?
Each answer shapes the appropriate response. None of them comes automatically from a sensor alert.
Mitigation can have cascading consequences. A drone is a federally regulated aircraft. It may be transmitting radio frequency (RF) signals. It may contain personally identifiable information (PII). It may carry a payload. If interfered with, it can fall, potentially onto people or property. For all of these reasons and more, mitigation is the last layer of response, not the first. That distinction matters enormously for how detection systems should be scoped, marketed and deployed. Federal Air Marshal Service representative Osborne explained, “The best mitigation is identifying and reaching the pilot.”
Lesson Learned: Integrators building C-UAS products who want to align with how agencies actually want to resolve incidents, must build an architecture requirement for detection systems that support operator location, not just aircraft tracking.
Scale the Industry Should Understand
The volume data of drone traffic currently in the National Airspace System (NAS) should recalibrate any assumptions about how frequently detection systems are taxed. Osborne described tens of thousands of annual drone detections within two miles of Newark International Airport alone. That figure, the current operational reality at a single facility, should frighten us.
For corrections, the threat profile is different but equally scary. DiGenni described drone-based contraband delivery into correctional facilities, a problem that, in one documented incident, went entirely undetected until officers heard an unexpected thud. Weeks passed before a crashed drone was found on the property.
Lesson Learned: Detection systems that rely on visual observation or post-incident discovery are inadequate. Acoustic sensors, RF detection and radar integration have become baseline requirements in environments where small UAS may operate at night, at low altitude or from unpredictable vectors.
DETER: Enforcement Catches Up
The regulatory environment shaping how agencies respond to drone violations just also shifted in a meaningful way. The FAA’s Drone Expedited and Targeted Enforcement Response, or DETER, program became effective April 17, 2026. The program supports President Trump’s executive order on restoring American airspace sovereignty and is designed to close the gap between detection and consequence.
Under DETER, eligible first-time violators can resolve minor operational violations through reduced civil penalties or certificate suspensions, but only by admitting liability and waiving appeal rights. Operators have 10 days to complete required steps once enrolled. (See prior AG coverage of DETER).
Law enforcement partners can now notify the FAA of violations in real time, which creates a direct pipeline from field detection to federal enforcement action. That pipeline matters for how agencies think about their detection infrastructure. The FAA has already flagged the upcoming FIFA World Cup as a priority enforcement period. High-profile mass gatherings will now provide test cases for the full detection-to-enforcement chain.
Lesson Learned: Systems that can generate exportable, time-stamped, legally defensible incident documentation are now more valuable than ever because there is finally a regulatory mechanism that can act on that documentation quickly. For integrators, DETER signals a product requirement.
The Real POETE Gap
Buying sensors does not equate to building capability. This deserves to be heard clearly.
Ambio, of the New Jersey Office of Homeland Security and Preparedness, looks at it through a POETE (Planning, Organization, Equipment, Training, and Exercise) model lens. “It is not just the equipment piece,” he noted. Detection hardware provides just one node in a system that also requires policy authorization, interagency communications, reporting protocols and exercises that stress-test the entire chain before an incident occurs.
Influential Drones’ Krause addressed the human side of that equation from an industry perspective. “Law enforcement officers and other field responders need to feel confident when approaching a drone operator. This includes having the ability to speak the same operational language.” Drone literacy is not automatic. The ability to read a Remote ID signal, identify a platform, understand its capabilities, and recognize the basic terminology used by drone operators must be developed before the encounter occurs. That preparation helps personnel communicate clearly, reduce confusion, and keep the conversation focused on safety, compliance, and the facts of the operation.
Lesson Learned: Products that support operator education and situational awareness tools for non-specialist users have a concrete market, but need to be accompanied by drone education exercised regularly.
The Jurisdictional Reality
Drone incidents don’t respect municipal boundaries. A single UAS event can originate in one jurisdiction, cross into another, approach an airport and pass near a mass gathering, all in minutes. Interoperability between agencies is operationally necessary. Compatible systems, shared common operating pictures (COPs) and pre-negotiated mutual support agreements provide the necessary infrastructure layer beneath whatever hardware gets deployed.
Lesson Learned: For manufacturers and integrators, this reinforces an often under-delivered requirement for open architecture and data-sharing protocols as prerequisites for fielding.
A Stolen Fleet and the Actual Threat Surface
The panel’s lessons take on new urgency in light of recent events right in New Jersey. Fifteen Ceres Air C31 agricultural spraying drones were stolen from CAC International, a logistics and shipping company in Harrison, New Jersey, on March 24. Each aircraft is roughly the size of an ATV and capable of dispersing up to 40 gallons of liquid across a 15-mile span in under seven minutes. New Jersey State Police, with Homeland Security Investigations and Customs and Border Protection assistance, recovered the drones on April 27 at a facility in Dover, Delaware. However, federal and state agencies continue to investigate a potential weaponization scenario.
The incident provides instruction beyond its headlines. C-UAS planning that focuses exclusively on consumer or hobbyist platforms misses a rapidly expanding threat surface.
Agricultural drones, inspection platforms, delivery systems,and commercial-grade UAS can all enter the security picture. Intent, location or control can change without warning.
Lesson Learned: For manufacturers designing detection payloads or mitigation systems, the classification of a drone as “agricultural” or “commercial” is no longer a reliable proxy for low risk. Threat modeling must account for platform capability, not just origin or intended use.
Shore to Soar provided exactly the kind of cross-sector setting where those requirements get surfaced, before the next incident forces the conversation. The expert practitioners on this panel have moved well past theory. The industry would do well to follow.