By ARIE EGOZI, Autonomy Global – Ambassador for Israel
Israeli technology may soon play a key role in protecting Norway’s new Arctic subsea communication cables to Svalbard and Jan Mayen, as Oslo confronts the security risks created by turning these links into giant distributed acoustic sensing (DAS) arrays. Norwegian authorities fear that the same physics that enables DAS for legitimate monitoring could be exploited by hostile intelligence services to build covert ISR systems on the seabed.
Modern fiber-optic systems such as the Arctic Way route can inject laser pulses into the cable and read tiny changes in backscattered light. This effectively transforms tens or hundreds of kilometers of fiber into a continuous hydrophone line. It allows the cable to detect vibrations and sounds from submarines, surface ships, unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs), divers, earthquakes and other activity at significant stand-off ranges. Israeli experts note that these underwater communication cables therefore function as massive, distributed sonar arrays whose data can be localized over thousands of miles.
The dual-use nature of DAS drives Norway’s concern. If a hostile actor can gain access to, or parasitically couple into, segments of the new Arctic cables, they could derive movement patterns of submarines, surface traffic or underwater infrastructure activity in highly sensitive Arctic approaches. The issue is particularly acute given that Norway already operates seabed sensor networks, some of which were previously disabled after cables were mysteriously cut in incidents widely linked in Oslo to possible sabotage.
Israeli company CyberRidge has emerged with a potential answer focused on protecting the data transiting underwater communication cables rather than just the physical infrastructure. Its technology uses light manipulation inside the fiber itself so that any intercepted traffic appears as random noise, useless to an adversary. Dedicated hardware units installed at the cable endpoints reconstruct the data stream using a rapidly changing photonic key. They allow legitimate users to read traffic while keeping it opaque to eavesdroppers.
According to CyberRidge, this approach can obscure data transmission even in scenarios where cables are physically cut or tapped by sophisticated nation-state adversaries. By pushing the security function into the optical layer, the system aims to make interception undetectable and unexploitable and complement traditional measures such as encryption and physical hardening. The company’s concepts align with broader European interest in fiber-optic sensing on seabed cables, which is rising in the wake of several high-profile sabotage incidents.
CyberRidge is not the only Israeli player in the underwater domain. DSIT Solutions, a subsidiary of Rafael, offers a range of underwater surveillance systems that can be integrated into national architectures for seabed infrastructure protection. These systems are designed to detect and classify threats such as divers, UUVs and surface vessels approaching critical undersea assets to provide an additional layer of situational awareness around cable routes and landing points.
Norway is significantly expanding its high-capacity subsea fiber links to Svalbard and Jan Mayen. Its Armed Forces plan to lease capacity for 25 years. This explicitly ties the infrastructure to national security and defense missions. As part of this effort, Norwegian services are evaluating how best to harness DAS for their own early-warning and surveillance needs while simultaneously mitigating the risk that adversaries could turn the same cables into clandestine sensor networks.
Practical protective measures already under discussion or in use include installing double-armored cable sections in high-risk zones, tightening route control and building enhanced physical protection around landings and branching units. Operators are also increasing naval, air and undersea patrols along critical routes and around key nodes, using technical monitoring to detect abnormal DAS interrogations, tapping attempts or other anomalies on the fiber.
Norway and its North Sea partners have elevated subsea infrastructure protection to a strategic priority. They have issued a joint declaration that treats energy and telecoms cables as critical national and allied assets. NATO is involved as well, primarily by sharing anomaly data and threat intelligence on suspicious activity near underwater cables that support both military and civilian networks. In this context, Israel’s emerging photonic cyber solutions and underwater surveillance technologies are drawing growing interest as Europe races to secure the seabed backbone of its digital and defense infrastructure.