The next counter-UAS breakthrough may depend less on a new interceptor than on whether a soldier can understand a screen, a sensor can provide enough warning and a commander can trust the systems working together.
That challenge connected industry and government perspectives during “Counter-UAS Perspectives,” a CUAS Accelerator panel moderated by Jim Falasco, Strategic Collaborator and Panel Chair for the Counter-UAS Accelerator Working Group (CUAS-AWG). Panelists examined capability gaps, operational demands, system integration and the pathways that move technology into useful, sustainable deployment. Their discussion centered on integration, not simply connecting equipment, but aligning technology with the mission, the operator and the realities of combat.
- Carly Halloran brought experience across software engineering, systems architecture, operational experimentation and mission analysis at Raytheon.
- Lieutenant Colonel (USA Ret.) Michael Trujillo, now Sr. Solutions Architect at Lyntris, offered an operational commander’s perspective alongside his work on command and control, sensor integration and capability delivery.
- Daniel Cordner, an operations research analyst with SPA-Group W supporting U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), explained how modeling and field observations can expose weaknesses before decision-makers mistake a promising system for a complete defense.
Together, they outlined a demanding standard for counter-UAS capability: prove that it closes an operational gap, fits the broader defense architecture and helps people make better decisions under pressure.
Counter-UAS System Integration Starts at the Seams
Halloran identified a fundamental tension between emerging technology and existing air defense infrastructure. Military organizations have invested heavily in fielded capabilities, yet many of those systems follow closed architectural approaches that complicate the adoption of newer, more flexible technologies. “The challenge is really at the seams,” she said, as she described the junction between innovative industry offerings and systems that developers originally built for different threats under different architectural assumptions.
Preserving those existing capabilities matters. So does creating room for faster adaptation. Halloran argued that the defense community has learned how to insert new technology into established, stovepiped architectures, but still struggles to move in the other direction toward greater flexibility.
That changes the meaning of integration. A successful connection between two components does not necessarily create an architecture that can accommodate the next sensor, effector or threat. Halloran called for approaches that retain essential fielded capabilities while allowing the broader technology ecosystem to contribute more quickly.
Operator-Centered Counter-UAS Design Cannot Wait Until Fielding
LTC (R) Trujillo approached the problem through the familiar comparison of streaming services. Users typically learn how to search for a program within seconds because the interface makes the next action obvious. Counter-UAS interfaces, he argued, need that same intuitive quality, with far higher stakes.
A commander may face incoming fire, competing demands and a flood of sensor data simultaneously. The interface must help that commander understand the situation without adding another layer of confusion. “You’re not sitting on your couch eating popcorn,” Trujillo said. “You’re actively making life and death decisions for the people that you lead.”
Achieving that clarity requires operator involvement throughout development, not a feedback session after delivery. LTC (R) Trujillo described working with soldiers during development and prototyping, while acknowledging the difficulty of fitting industry engagement into crowded military training schedules.
He also urged developers to recognize three practical constraints: training time, physical burden and power. A capability that demands lengthy instruction, consumes scarce vehicle space or adds excessive weight can create new operational problems even as it addresses a technical gap.
His preferred starting point was not a product demonstration. It was a question: “Tell us what’s keeping you from accomplishing your mission.” That conversation, he argued, should shape requirements before developers decide which technology provides the answer.
Counter-UAS Modeling Must Answer an Operational Question
Cordner emphasized that modeling and simulation should begin with a clearly defined analytical question. Without one, analysts can generate extensive metrics without resolving the decision that matters.
Before live testing, he recommended examining how a proposed system would integrate, what role it would serve and when operators should transition between defensive layers. Modeling efforts can explore combinations of weapons, platforms and locations, including alternative uses for existing capabilities. The goal is to identify promising arrangements that justify subsequent testing.
Sensing and detection deserve particular scrutiny. Cordner explained that a system’s advertised capability may offer little value at a location where its sensor cannot provide sufficient early warning.
Model assumptions also determine what decision-makers can legitimately conclude. Cordner cautioned against turning a scenario-specific result into a broad claim that a base can defeat a particular number of drones. Attack direction, speed, spacing and drone type all influence that result. Weather assumptions and operator performance can further change the picture.
He described examining operational data, including recordings of operators moving through identification and engagement procedures. Fatigue, unfamiliarity and environmental stress can affect performance in ways that a simplified model misses.
Analysts must communicate “exactly what this modeling is telling them and what it is not telling them,” Cordner said.
Faster Drone Defense Decisions Require Better Discrimination
Halloran framed the engagement process as a balance between early warning and confidence. Earlier detection gives operators more time, but waiting for stronger identification consumes that time. Any decision must also leave enough time for the selected weapon to neutralize the threat.
Even a successful engagement can create additional risks. Halloran cited debris, collateral damage and radio-frequency effects on nearby friendly systems. The defended mission and location therefore need to shape the response, not merely the target’s presence.
LTC (R) Trujillo extended that argument to ammunition management and tactical judgment. Commanders cannot necessarily engage every drone they detect. They need enough information to distinguish threats and decide where to concentrate limited effectors.
He described a multiwave attack concept in which drones might first disrupt movement and morale, then conduct reconnaissance and finally support targeting. His point was not that every incoming formation follows that pattern, but that sensing and data fusion must help commanders understand purpose as well as presence.
Counter-UAS technology should also complement, rather than replace, battlefield fundamentals. LTC (R) Trujillo pointed to dispersion, concealment and overhead protection as practices that remain important regardless of the systems industry supplies. The capability, in his eyes, serves as a combat multiplier, not a substitute for tactics.
Integrated Counter-UAS Testing Needs Mission-Level Evidence
Testing an individual component differs substantially from proving that a multivendor architecture can accomplish a mission.
Halloran described the challenge of combining evidence from organizations that use different instrumentation, data collection methods and analytical approaches. The complexity grows as additional vendors and capabilities enter the architecture.
Her proposed anchor was a shared set of mission-level and architecture-level metrics. Those measures should guide test planning across facilities with different strengths, allowing teams to assemble evidence from multiple experiments into a coherent assessment of operational performance.
For working groups seeking to turn capability gaps into action, Halloran recommended starting with the desired outcome and defining how the team would recognize success. From there, participants can develop a scenario and mission thread, identify the necessary capabilities, instrument each step and jointly analyze the results.
Teams also need acceptable tolerances. An experiment may not hit every target precisely, but decision-makers still need a defensible basis for determining whether the result warrants the next step.
Cordner described a complementary feedback loop. After engagements, his team seeks field data to identify unexpected behavior, improve models and explore how the same scenario might unfold at other locations. He also utilizes under-developed models when there is a lack of tactics and employment information to generate discussions with stake-holders that will fill those gaps..
Counter-UAS Deployment Pathways Must Address Cost and Sustainment
LTC (R) Trujillo argued that adoption requires more than convincing an operational unit. Developers must also make a credible case to the organizations that fund capabilities and oversee integration.
That case needs both technical and tactical substance. A system must connect to the architecture, but it must also fit how a service or joint force actually fights. Trujillo favored concept-focused experimentation over vendor showcases that display equipment without demonstrating how it solves an operational problem.
Affordability and acceptable loss also influence sustainment. He advocated low-cost, attritable capabilities that commanders can afford to lose, rather than equipment whose recovery consumes training time or exposes personnel to unnecessary risk. His deployment standard remains grounded in the operator: manageable training, limited power demands, practical weight and storage requirements and a cost structure that does not make every loss a crisis.
The panel’s discussion placed the hardest work between invention and employment. Closing a counter-UAS gap requires developers, analysts, operators and funding authorities to agree on the problem, establish credible measures and test the full mission rather than the hardware alone. Only then can promising technology become a capability a commander can actually use and trust.
Photo credits: Drew Swenson / Livewire, courtesy of S4B Defense Corp.