Drones Power Energy Operations. They’re Also Testing Their Defenses.

Anelo/shutterstock.com; How do energy asset owners tell friend from foe? As the sector, and others, increasingly use drones, this question creates a significant security challenge.

Until the last few years, securing critical energy infrastructure involved physical perimeters, access point control and ground threat monitoring. But as drones grow in numbers and capabilities, energy operators have a new vulnerability in the airspace above and around their facilities. Power plants, substations, refineries, pipelines, and storage facilities are increasingly exposed to unauthorized drone activity, which presents a serious security issue. At the same time, drone technology has become an essential tool for energy operators in inspection, maintenance and emergency response workflows. The challenge lies in determining how to distinguish legitimate operations from potential threats and responding to the nefarious actors without disrupting approved activities.

At the Energy Security/C-UAS Forum, held this summer at the Energy Drone & Robotics Summit, industry leaders discussed the evolving landscape and the growing challenges facing energy operators. Discussions centered around how airspace security is becoming an essential component of energy infrastructure protection while technology and regulations are shifting quickly. Here are some of the themes discussed in sessions at the forum.

The Growing Threat to Energy Infrastructure

Suzanne Lemieux (API), Matt Fuller (AFPM), and Sunny Arokia Swamy Bellary (EPRI) discuss airspace security challenges and solutions for energy operators.

Internationally, drone attacks have caused widespread outages and operational disruptions over the last few years. These incidents have proven that relatively inexpensive uncrewed aircraft can disrupt energy production and interrupt essential services. U.S. energy operators face these challenges as well. 

During a C-UAS Forum discussion, Matt Fuller, Senior Policy Analyst at American Fuel & Petrochemical Manufacturers (AFPM), described unauthorized drone pilots flying dangerously close to refinery equipment. Fuller said AFPM members had discovered online videos showing “Part 107 pilots flying around refineries like they’re at a racetrack.” A drone that loses control or crashes into sensitive equipment would gravely impact critical operations.

Beyond the risk of a crash, Fuller raised concerns about corporate espionage because some pilots have been recording and selling footage. Drones can collect detailed imagery of facility operations without triggering a traditional physical security alert.

The problem also affects energy companies’ own drone operations. During a session’s Q&A period, an audience member at the forum, who identified themselves as working at an energy operator, described how unauthorized drone flights around the company’s tank facilities have interfered with planned inspections. “They’ve become a real serious problem for our internal operations because we have to shut down our internal inspection operations with UAS to accommodate these people that are flying around,” they said.

Drones are a valuable tool that also create a difficult security challenge. A drone approaching a facility might represent a routine flight, an accidental incursion, corporate espionage, or a potential attack. Quickly determining which category each aircraft falls into isn’t currently possible for most facilities.

Detection Capabilities Are Lagging Behind

Jen Daskal (Venable), Jason Day (DRONERESPONDERS), Dawn Zoldi (P3 Tech Consulting/Autonomy Global), and Angelissa Savino (Savino Skies Consulting) discuss layered airspace defense, security vulnerabilities, and mitigation strategies.

Right now, there’s a gap between the industry’s need for drone detection relative to deployment of technology with these capabilities. During the C-UAS Forum, Fuller shared AFPM member survey findings. In 2025, approximately 85% of respondents expressed interest in advanced drone detection technologies, but only about 30% reported owning them. In 2026, interest increased to about 90%, while actual ownership remained around one-third of respondents.

An earlier, broader industry survey in 2024 found that 82% of respondents relied on personnel to visually spot drones, with only 9% reporting use of advanced detection systems. 

These findings illustrate the distance between security concerns and operational capabilities. Traditional surveillance cameras, personnel and perimeter sensors are not capable of monitoring low-altitude airspace for unauthorized UAVs. Small drones can approach quickly, operate beyond visual range and blend into complex industrial environments.

Modern C-UAS detection systems address these limitations through combinations of radio frequency (RF) sensors, radar, acoustic detection and optical or thermal cameras because no single technology works well in every environment.

Sunny Bellary of the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) described research evaluating detection technologies in increasingly challenging conditions, including substations containing extensive metallic infrastructure and strong electromagnetic fields. “Every technology has pros and cons,” he said. “That is something that we have learned over the period of testing the systems.”

EPRI’s testing has evolved from individual sensors toward systems that combine multiple detection methods through sensor fusion. This layered approach helps compensate for the limitations of individual technologies by combining the outputs of different technologies.

Mitigation Remains a Complicated Challenge

Detecting a potentially dangerous drone is just one piece of a C-UAS strategy. Determining how to respond remains another, more complex, part of the equation. Traditional counter-drone methods include RF jamming, electronic takeover, and physical interception. However, many mitigation techniques are restricted under federal law, and their use near sensitive energy equipment introduces additional risks.

For example, jamming a drone’s communications could interfere with industrial wireless systems or cause an aircraft to crash. Incidents around energized electrical equipment or in hazardous processing areas would create a more serious disruption than the original intrusion. Emerging technologies offer more targeted alternatives, including systems to take control of intruding drones and guide them to a safe landing. 

However, just because a self-defense tool works doesn’t mean it’s legal. During a forum panel on layered airspace defense, Jennifer Daskal, Partner at Venable, cautioned, “Relying on self-defense as our mitigation strategy is a really bad strategy.” Instead, she recommends establishing appropriate legal authority, training requirements and operational procedures that allow qualified personnel to respond effectively.

For now, as regulations remain in flux, and until broader mitigation capabilities are approved, energy operators can make meaningful progress through:

  • Physical security measures 
  • Detection
  • Incident reporting
  • Coordination with authorized law enforcement

New Regulations Create Opportunities and Questions

ORKID Tech showcases its ORKID 260 VTOL platform at the EDR Summit Expo, highlighting multi-mission capabilities including a Counter-UAS interceptor variant.

Regulatory developments continue to impact what energy operators and public safety agencies can do about unauthorized drones. The SAFER SKIES Act established a pathway for trained state, local, tribal, and territorial (SLTT) law enforcement personnel to conduct certain drone detection and mitigation activities.

Agencies still have to satisfy training and authorization requirements, and mitigation activities are subject to significant legal limitations. Angie Savino, Founder and Managing Attorney of Savino Skies Consulting, emphasized that the legislation merely created a pathway to additional capabilities. “The law didn’t give immediate access to SLTTs to start using counter UAS detection and mitigation technology,” she said.

Meanwhile, the FAA’s proposed Section 2209 rule would establish a process for eligible critical infrastructure operators to request drone flight restrictions around their facilities. The proposal establishes eligibility guidelines, which have raised concerns across the energy industry. Rather than the current production-based approach, C-UAS Forum participants argued that a risk-based approach would better account for each facility’s need for airspace restrictions.

Suzanne Lemieux, Director of Security and Emergency Management at the American Petroleum Institute (API), said, “What we are arguing for in our comments is a more risk-based approach and flexibility because as anyone in the energy industry knows, what’s critical today might not be critical in the summer or the winter.”

Daskal raised concerns about proposed application requirements that could require facilities to submit sensitive security information, including vulnerability assessments and details about existing protective measures. She said, “Now imagine if that information got out, whether intentionally or unintentionally or the result of a cyber attack. It’s basically a honeypot.”

Building an Integrated Security Strategy

Effective C-UAS protection will integrate aerial threat awareness into existing security operations, including:

  • Procedures for identifying unauthorized aircraft
  • Notification communication
  • Coordination with law enforcement
  • Incident documentation

Brandon Youngblood, Senior Consultant at ZBeta and former head of the FAA’s UAS Security Counter-UAS office, stressed the importance of developing comprehensive programs before an incident occurs. “You don’t need to wait for laws to change to start building out that program today,” he explained at the C-UAS Forum.

Meanwhile, autonomous security technologies have expanded the capabilities available to infrastructure operators. Ryan Hodgens, National Sales Director at Asylon Robotics, described how autonomous ground robots and aerial drones can supplement traditional security operations, particularly at large, remote facilities. At one U.S. water treatment facility, an autonomous ground robot joined the graveyard shift. “In the first year it completed 4,622 patrols logging 5,520 miles, reporting 167 human verified security events as well,” he noted.

Hodgens also explained that ground robots seem particularly effective for routine inspections of entry points while aerial drones provide wide-area surveillance and perimeter inspections. This use case demonstrates how automated monitoring can expand security coverage while keeping human operators involved in threat assessment and response. The next step is connecting these capabilities with aerial threat detection and response.

Preparing for the Next Phase of Energy Security

Energy operators have adapted to integrate drones into their workflows. Now they must adapt to detect and respond to unauthorized drone operations. The next few years will involve discussions around how to build effective, legally compliant systems that can distinguish legitimate drone operations from threats and support coordinated responses. All of this requires continued progress in detection technology, regulatory frameworks, industry standards and public-private collaboration.

As Daskal pointed out during the forum, “We can’t do good mitigation if we don’t have detection.”

These challenges will remain a central focus at the 2027 Energy Security/C-UAS Forum, scheduled for June 21, 2027, in The Woodlands, Texas, at the Energy Drone & Robotics Summit. The forum will bring together energy asset owners, security professionals, technology providers, regulators and law enforcement to continue examining the landscape of infrastructure protection. Hope to see ya’ll there!