The Department of War (DoW) is building an autonomy enterprise rather than a single “drone headquarters.” As of September 30, 2026, it recast its Direct Reporting Portfolio Manager for Unmanned Systems initiative as Project Agincourt, which carries forward the portfolio mission while establishing the pathway to a planned four-star Autonomous Warfare Command, or AUTOWARCOM. The department has set October 1, 2027 as the target date for AUTOWARCOM’s establishment, subject to the congressional action and implementation required to create it. (See prior AG News coverage of AUTOWARCOM).
The emerging model separates department-level governance, operational employment, rapid commercial transition, trusted procurement, counter-drone delivery, service force development and analytical decision support. The practical question is not who “owns drones.” It is which organization owns each part of the process: deciding priorities, buying systems, verifying supply chains, countering hostile drones, creating formations and employing autonomous systems in combat.
Disconnected Programs Become An Autonomy Enterprise
Traditionally, the U.S. military managed unmanned aircraft, robotic ground systems, unmanned surface and underwater vessels, loitering munitions, counter-UAS systems and autonomy software through separate service programs, laboratories, program offices and operational experiments. That approach created valuable capability, but it also fragmented accountability. Requirements, funding, supply-chain assurance, testing, training, doctrine and operational employment often moved through different organizations at different speeds.
The DoW is trying to connect those pieces. Its emerging approach focuses on six linked tasks:
- Align UxS priorities, activities and funding across the department.
- Accelerate procurement and fielding of low-cost, attritable and one-way attack systems.
- Build trusted supply chains for airframes, payloads, components, software and repair.
- Rapidly deliver counter-small-UAS capabilities to deployed forces and domestic partners.
- Create trained formations, doctrine and sustainment systems across the services.
- Use modeling, simulation and analysis to assess force design, resiliency and mission tradeoffs before committing to major investments.
The original organizational move came on July 1, 2026, when the DoW established the Direct Reporting Portfolio Manager for Unmanned Systems, or DRPM-UxS. The office reported directly to the Deputy Secretary of War and was tasked with oversight and direction of UxS activities, functions and associated funding across the military departments, DIU, JIATF 401 and the Defense Autonomous Warfare Group (DAWG).
On Sept. 30, the department recast that work under Project Agincourt. The Secretary described the move as: “the unmanned systems DRPM becomes Project Agincourt.” Agincourt will continue the DRPM mission while driving the organizational shifts, planning and congressional engagement needed to stand up AUTOWARCOM.
AUTOWARCOM Is The Planned Operational Center
AUTOWARCOM may arguably be the most consequential part of the restructuring because it is intended to make autonomous warfare a standing joint function rather than a collection of service experiments and platform programs.
The department has announced AUTOWARCOM as a four-star functional combatant command (COCOM) with “service-like authorities.” It is expected to accelerate the fielding and integration of autonomous and robotic systems across the joint force and provide focused support to geographic combatant commands.
The most important phrase is “service-like authorities.” If Congress authorizes the structure as planned, AUTOWARCOM would have more than an advisory or coordinating role. The concept calls for dedicated manpower, budget and acquisition authority, along with new career pathways for personnel working with unmanned and autonomous systems. That model resembles the way U.S. Special Operations Command combines operational responsibilities with distinctive authorities for force development and acquisition. It is not a perfect analogy because autonomy cuts across every domain and force structure, while special operations has a more clearly defined community. But the design signals that the department sees unmanned and robotic warfare as an enduring joint capability rather than a collection of temporary technology initiatives.
Importantly, AUTOWARCOM should not be described as if it already commands forces, manages a mature acquisition portfolio or has a final operating model. It does not. What is clear is the transition plan. Project Agincourt will carry forward the former DRPM-UxS mission, execute near-term organizational changes and work with Congress to create the conditions for AUTOWARCOM’s target establishment on Oct. 1, 2027.
The management challenge will be preventing the new command from becoming another coordination layer. AUTOWARCOM will need enough authority to set joint priorities and accelerate capability without duplicating the services’ force-development and acquisition responsibilities.
RAPTR Supports Technology Readiness and Transition
The RAPTR Task Force, or Rapid Assessment of Prototype Technology Readiness, belongs to the Department of War’s technology assessment and transition layer. It is not an operational command, a drone program office, a procurement authority or a vehicle-level autonomy software system.
The task force operates within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, or OUSD(R&E). Its mission is to assess whether prototype technologies have reached sufficient maturity, technical performance and operational utility to move toward fielding.
RAPTR conducts that work through operationally relevant assessments and demonstrations, including Technology Readiness Experimentation, or T-REX, events. These events put emerging systems into realistic conditions so the department can identify failure points, validate performance claims, reduce technical risk and determine whether a prototype merits further investment, acquisition or transition to a service or operational user.
For autonomous and unmanned systems, RAPTR sits upstream of large-scale procurement and operational employment. It can help assess candidate technologies such as unmanned aircraft and one-way attack systems; autonomous navigation, mission-planning and control software; swarming and collaborative-autonomy tools; counter-UAS sensing, command-and-control and defeat systems; edge computing, secure networking and resilient communications as well as payloads, sensors and mission-system integrations.
RAPTR does not decide the Department of War’s overall UxS strategy. It does not manage the Blue List, buy drones at scale, set counter-UAS policy or command unmanned forces in a theater. Instead, it helps answer a prior question: Is this technology mature, useful and robust enough to move out of prototype status?
CENTCOM Shows The Operational Model
USCENTCOM offers the clearest publicly documented example of the DoW moving from experimentation to dedicated operational autonomy formations. It is using unmanned systems to meet immediate theater requirements: countering hostile drones, protecting deployed forces, creating lower-cost strike options and integrating regional partners.
CENTCOM launched the Rapid Employment Joint Task Force, or RE-JTF, in September 2025 to accelerate the delivery of emerging technology to deployed forces. CENTCOM describes the organization as a mechanism for fielding and operationalizing capabilities in 60 days or less.
The RE-JTF’s first major public effort was the creation of Task Force Scorpion Strike, announced in December 2025 as the U.S. military’s first dedicated one-way attack-drone squadron in the Middle East. CENTCOM says Scorpion Strike has since reached several operational milestones. It conducted the first launch of an aerial attack drone from a Navy warship in December 2025. It employed one-way UAS during Operation Epic Fury. It carried out unmanned attack-vessel strikes on Iranian port facilities in July 2026. These accomplishments should be framed as CENTCOM’s public account of its operations. They nevertheless show clearly that U.S. forces are not merely testing UxS in theater. Organizationally, CENTCOM has created a dedicated formation to employ them.
In August, CENTCOM announced Task Force Falcon Strike, which it describes as the first multinational, multi-domain attack-drone task force. The organization is designed to employ one-way attack systems in the air, on the sea and below the sea, with personnel from the United States and regional partners. U.S. Special Operations Command Central personnel will lead the staff.
AFCENT’s Task Force 99 plays a different role. It is the experimentation and test component, focused on UAS, AI, autonomy and counter-UAS concepts. Task Force 99 develops and demonstrates ideas that can inform the operational organizations that follow.
The CENTCOM model offers a useful shorthand: Task Force 99 tests; the RE-JTF fields; Scorpion Strike employs; Falcon Strike scales with partners. It also previews what geographic combatant commands may expect from AUTOWARCOM: rapid access to systems, survivable operational concepts, trained formations and sustainment at scale.
DIU, DCMA and JIATF 401 Perform Different Jobs
The Defense Innovation Unit (DIU), the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) and JIATF 401 often appear in the same autonomy discussion, but they solve different problems.
DIU Accelerates Commercial Transition
The DIU remains the department’s principal bridge to commercial technology. It identifies nontraditional suppliers, runs rapid competitions and helps transition promising systems into operational pathways.
DIU co-executes the Drone Dominance Program with the Test Resource Management Center and Naval Surface Warfare Center, Crane Division. The department has said the program could involve $1.1 billion across four phases and seeks to field hundreds of thousands of weaponized one-way attack drones by 2027. It has held two Gauntlet challenges so far and recently announced a 10-field leaderboard. (See prior AG News coverage of Drone Dominance). DIU’s role is to move commercial technology into defense use quickly. It is no longer the department’s long-term trusted-drone list manager.
DCMA Scales Trusted Procurement
The DCMA took over the Blue UAS/Blue List function from DIU in December 2025. DCMA’s US-X organization is now responsible for expanding the Blue List into a trusted procurement ecosystem.
The purpose is broader than maintaining a list of acceptable aircraft. US-X is building a system for supplier vetting, component verification, traceability, secure sourcing and scalable access to UAS and components. The intended result is that units can buy, repair and sustain trusted systems without having to independently validate every vendor and supply chain.
That distinction matters for industry. DIU can create a pathway from commercial innovation to military evaluation. DCMA can create a pathway from vetted suppliers to repeatable, scalable procurement.
JIATF 401 Concentrates On Counter-UAS
JIATF 401 is the department’s primary counter-small-UAS synchronization and delivery organization. The department established it in August 2025 to accelerate affordable counter-small-UAS capability for deployed forces and help protect national airspace.
Its work includes testing and qualification, interoperability, validation of solutions, coordination with other federal agencies and expanded capability access for allies and partners. The department’s Oct. 2 counter-UAS announcement further directed JIATF 401 to synchronize counter-UAS weapons-safety reviews with the unmanned-systems portfolio leadership. (See prior AG News coverage of the c-UAS announcement).
JIATF 401 is not the future AUTOWARCOM. Its focus is defensive: identifying, testing, integrating and delivering counter-small-UAS capability quickly enough to keep pace with drone threats.
Services Still Create The Force
The DoW can align portfolios and create a new functional command, but it cannot generate enduring autonomous combat capability without the services. They still own the long-term work of personnel development, formations, doctrine, training, sustainment and domain-specific integration.
The Army has directed the establishment of the Futures and Autonomous Systems Command, or FASCOM. The command will align Army autonomy priorities across aviation, armor, fires, sustainment, engineering and training. The Army also directed creation of a Portfolio Acquisition Executive for Autonomy and identified priorities including fires, combat vehicles, watercraft resupply, breaching, reconnaissance, surveillance, target acquisition and crewed-uncrewed teaming.
The Department of the Navy created a Rapid Capabilities Office and a Portfolio Acquisition Executive for Robotic and Autonomous Systems after Navy Secretary John Phelan said the department had identified more than 200 unmanned-system efforts across six program executive offices and nine funding lines. The new structure is intended to reduce fragmentation, prioritize requirements, compete solutions and integrate robotic and autonomous systems into fleet-ready force packages.
The Air Force is embedding autonomy through its Collaborative Combat Aircraft effort, which uses a government-controlled autonomy architecture and modular, open-systems approach (MOSA). In 2026, the service reported validating its Autonomy Government Reference Architecture across vendor platforms and conducting semi-autonomous flight testing involving General Atomics’ YFQ-42 and Anduril’s YFQ-44.
The Coast Guard sits outside the Department of War because it is a Department of Homeland Security service, but it belongs in any comprehensive view of federal autonomy activity. Its newly created Robotics and Autonomous Systems Program Executive Office and CG-781 organization are building systems, workforce and operational capacity across aerial, surface, subsurface and ground robotics. The Coast Guard announced nearly $350 million for robotics and autonomy investments, including short-range UAS, remotely operated vehicles and ground robots for infrastructure inspection, pollution response, post-storm surveys, ice operations and hazardous-response missions.
What The New Structure Means
The DoW’s reorganization is not evidence that the United States has found a single, settled answer to autonomous warfare. It is evidence that the department has recognized the shortcomings of treating unmanned systems as a collection of isolated technology programs.
The test is not how many autonomy offices the DoW creates. The test is whether this enterprise can field systems that are affordable, interoperable, repairable, supply-chain secure and resilient under attack…and whether trained units can use them before the threat, technology and operational environment change again.
Editor’s note: This article reflects public announcements and official releases available through Oct. 5, 2026. AUTOWARCOM has been announced but is not yet an operational combatant command.
U.S. Autonomy Organization Chart
| Organization | Status And Reporting Position | Primary Responsibility | What It Is Not |
| Project Agincourt | Announced Sept. 30, 2026, as the successor framework to the Direct Reporting Portfolio Manager for Unmanned Systems mission | Carries forward the former DRPM-UxS portfolio mission; drives near-term organizational change and develops the legislative and implementation pathway to establish AUTOWARCOM | Not an operational combatant command or a replacement for service responsibility to organize, train and equip forces |
| AUTOWARCOM — Autonomous Warfare Command | Announced Sept. 30, 2026; target establishment date of Oct. 1, 2027, subject to congressional action and implementation | Planned four-star functional combatant command intended to accelerate autonomous and robotic warfare capability, establish scalable joint requirements and support geographic combatant commands | Not yet an operating command; its final statutory authorities, budget and command relationships are not yet public |
| Military departments and services | Retain core Title 10 responsibilities for their respective forces | Organize, train, equip, sustain and operate domain-specific autonomous forces; build formations, personnel specialties, doctrine and acquisition pathways | Not mere force providers; they remain responsible for converting systems into enduring combat capability |
| DIU — Defense Innovation Unit | Department-level commercial-technolgy and rapid-transition organization | Identifies and transitions commercial technology; runs rapid competitions and co-executes selected urgent programs, including Drone Dominance | No longer the institutional owner of the Blue UAS Cleared List |
| DCMA US-X — Unmanned Systems–Experimental Command | Defense Contract Management Agency Special Programs Command organization | Operates and expands the Blue List ecosystem for trusted small UAS and components; conducts vendor assessment, supply-chain verification and procurement-pathway development | Not a general-purpose drone developer, a service acquisition executive or an operational UAS command |
| JIATF 401 — Joint Interagency Task Force 401 | Established in August 2025 as the Department of War’s lead counter-small-UAS synchronization and delivery organization | Integrates, qualifies and rapidly delivers counter-small-UAS capabilities; supports interoperability, validated solution pathways, weapons-safety coordination, federal collaboration and allied access | Not the department’s lead for offensive UAS, all autonomous systems or the future AUTOWARCOM |
| DAWG — Defense Autonomous Warfare Group | Department-level autonomy effort operating within the wider UxS enterprise | Supports agile autonomy integration, prototype testing and experimentation with services, operational users and industry | Not a combatant command, acquisition authority or substitute for Project Agincourt, JIATF 401 or AUTOWARCOM |
| RAPTR Task Force — Rapid Assessment of Prototype Technology Readiness | Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering technology-readiness and experimentation organization; public reporting identifies Army Lt. Col. Matt Limeberry as commander | Assesses prototype technology maturity and military utility in operationally relevant environments, including Technology Readiness Experimentation, or T-REX; reduces risk before transition, acquisition or wider fielding | Not LMI’s RAPTR software platform, an operational UAS command, a UxS procurement authority or a portfolio-governance office |
| USCENTCOM autonomy enterprise | Geographic combatant-command effort shaped by active theater requirements | Rapidly fields and operationalizes one-way attack UAS, counter-drone systems and other emerging technologies for CENTCOM missions | Not AUTOWARCOM or a service-like functional command |
| RE-JTF — Rapid Employment Joint Task Force | CENTCOM rapid-fielding mechanism, launched in September 2025 | Connects emerging technology with deployed forces; CENTCOM says it is designed to field and operationalize selected capabilities in 60 days or less | Not a stand-alone acquisition executive or solely an experimentation organization |
| Task Force Scorpion Strike | CENTCOM task force announced in December 2025 under the RE-JTF | Dedicated U.S. one-way attack-drone squadron in the Middle East; develops and employs low-cost attack-UAS capability in theater | Not CENTCOM’s complete UxS enterprise or a multinational formation |
| Task Force Falcon Strike | Announced Aug. 13, 2026; multinational, multi-domain task force; staffed under SOCCENT leadership | Develops regional-partner employment of one-way attack systems in aerial, surface and subsurface domains | Not limited to aerial drones and not interchangeable with Scorpion Strike |
| AFCENT Task Force 99 | U.S. Air Forces Central innovation, test and evaluation organization | Develops, tests and demonstrates UAS, AI, autonomy and counter-UAS concepts, including with partner participation | Not the operational attack-drone squadron or CENTCOM’s primary rapid-fielding mechanism |
| Army FASCOM — Futures and Autonomous Systems Command | Directed by Army leadership on Oct. 1, 2026 | Aligns Army autonomy priorities, force development, talent and acquisition across aviation, armor, fires, sustainment, engineering and training | Not the joint operational autonomy command or a replacement for Army program executive offices |
| Department of the Navy RCO and PAE RAS | Navy and Marine Corps service-level structure: Rapid Capabilities Office and Portfolio Acquisition Executive for Robotic and Autonomous Systems | Consolidates robotic and autonomous-system requirements, acquisition and fleet integration across the Department of the Navy | Not a joint operational headquarters or an independent combatant command |
| Coast Guard RAS PEO and CG-781 | Department of Homeland Security organizations outside the Department of War’s internal UxS chain | Develops Coast Guard robotics and autonomy capability through workforce, training, acquisition and operational integration across aerial, surface, subsurface and ground systems | Not part of Project Agincourt or AUTOWARCOM, despite its relevance to homeland security, ports, maritime infrastructure and counter-UAS operations |