By: Joanna Wieczorek, Autonomy Global Ambassador – Europe
At this year’s flagship Cumulsy event in Poland, Dawn Zoldi provided an overview on the United States’ changing drone and counter-drone landscape. Those changes have recently come at a pace and scale that should command the attention of every serious drone stakeholder outside U.S. borders. From a sweeping proposed beyond visual line of sight (BVLOS) framework to aggressive enforcement, national security-driven import controls and a historic reorganization of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Washington D.C. has clearly messaged that drones are now central to airspace, defense and industrial policy.
For European regulators, operators, and manufacturers, these American moves should be viewed as early signals of norms, market shifts and security standards that will surely ripple across alliances and global supply chains over the next several years.
Part 108: The BVLOS Rule That Rewrites the Hierarchy of the Sky
The FAA’s proposed Part 108 rule, a sweeping performance-based framework meant to normalize beyond visual line of sight (BVLOS) operations at scale, sits at the center of these U.S. civil drone changes. Originally published in August 2025 with a standard 60-day comment period, the proposal drew more than 3,000 comments.
In late January 2026, the FAA took the unusual step of reopening that comment period for just 14 days, but only on a narrow set of issues: electronic conspicuity (EC), including ADSB-B detect-and-avoid technologies, and right-of-way rules. That targeted reopening shows where the real battle lines have been drawn. The basic rules of the road (who must see whom, and who must move for whom) appear to be at stake.
The most controversial proposed provision would, in specific circumstances, give BVLOS drones presumptive right of way over crewed aircraft that are not broadcasting ADS-B Out or another approved EC solution. That profound departure from the traditional hierarchy in which manned aviation has always come first puts pressure on general aviation (GA), glider communities and legacy fleets to adopt new EC measures or risk being treated as “less visible” participants in shared airspace.
Structurally, Part 108 also moves the U.S. away from the pilot-centric model of Part 107 and toward organizational responsibility. Instead of a single remote pilot bearing most of the regulatory burden, Part 108 envisions operators holding permits and, for more complex operations, full certificates anchored in Safety Management Systems (SMS). Autonomy seems to be the clear end state. The framework is designed for a world where fleets of unmanned aircraft operate routinely, with human involvement more supervisory than tactical.
For non-U.S. operators, two things matter most. First, any cross-border service model that touches U.S. airspace will eventually have to navigate this new regime. Second, the philosophical shift, away from individual responsibility and toward system-level assurance, could find echoes in other advanced aviation jurisdictions, including Europe. (Search Autonomy Global keyword “Part 108” for extensive coverage).
SAFER SKIES: Counter-UAS Authority Comes to the States
On the security side, the SAFER SKIES Act, folded into the U.S. National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for FY 2026 and signed in December 2025, resolves a long-running policy gap. Until now, only a few federal entities had legal authority to detect, disrupt or destroy threatening drones. SAFER SKIES extends that power to state, local, tribal, and territorial (SLTT) authorities, with strict guardrails.
Eligible law enforcement and corrections agencies can obtain authority to use approved counter-UAS (C-UAS) technologies, but only after completing federally mandated training and certification. They may detect, monitor, identify and track drones; warn operators; and, when a credible threat is present, disrupt control links or disable or destroy aircraft. Every mitigation action must be reported within tight deadlines. Only technologies vetted by a multi-agency federal process may be deployed. (See prior Autonomy Global coverage of SAFER SKIES here).
The Act also hardens penalties for using a drone to move contraband into a prison. That now carries significant sentence enhancements. Employing a UAS in furtherance of other crimes can now double available maximum penalties.
For European partners, the significance is twofold. Operationally, the U.S. will enter the 2026 FIFA World Cup and other major events with a much more mature legal and technical counter-UAS toolkit at both federal and local levels. Washington is building a model in which expanded defensive powers are explicitly tied to training, technology validation and reporting obligations. That framework could also shape how allied governments justify their own expansions of C-UAS authority.
The FCC Foreign Drone Ban: Security Versus Supply Chain
Just before Christmas 2025, the U.S. Federal Communications Commission (FCC) issued one of the most far-reaching decisions in the global drone market. It added all foreign-produced UAS and a wide range of critical components to its national security “Covered List.” In practice, that means no new FCC equipment authorizations for foreign drones and many key parts. It effectively blocks new imports, marketing and sales of future foreign systems into the U.S. market.
Critically, the action does not revoke existing authorizations. Previously approved foreign-made drones remain legal and can continue to be used. But the U.S. has sent an unmistakable message that it intends to wean itself off foreign platforms and components, particularly those tied to strategic competitors. To do so using its spectrum and equipment-authorization powers, not just defense procurement policy. (See AG coverage of original FCC ban).
That said, the move triggered intense pushback from the Pentagon and industry, which warned that an immediate, absolute ban would damage readiness and disrupt public safety operations that still rely heavily on foreign-built platforms. In January 2026, the FCC responded with a carefully calibrated walkback. It created a temporary exemption regime that now extends roughly two years from the original decision.
Under that regime, drones from allied manufacturers, platforms on the military’s Blue UAS cleared list and aircraft meeting Buy American content standards can continue to obtain equipment authorizations. The Pentagon and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) have also been given a unique carve-out to designate specific foreign systems or categories as not posing unacceptable security risks. The FCC has not afforded that type of flexibility to other classes of equipment on the Covered List.
For European manufacturers, the next two years are both an opportunity and stress test. The exemption window creates space for allied companies to consolidate their position in the U.S. market and, in some cases, to position themselves as compliant alternatives to Chinese platforms. But the underlying trajectory points toward a more fragmented global market, where security-driven technology blocs will harden around supply chains.
Drone Dominance: A Billion-Dollar Gauntlet
While the civil and security rules evolve, the U.S. military continues to move aggressively to institutionalize small unmanned aircraft as core battlefield tools. The “Drone Dominance” program, widely referred to by its Phase I nickname, “The Gauntlet,” is a four-phase competition worth roughly 1.1 billion dollars over its planned life.
Phase I focuses on low-cost, small, one-way attack drones. This reflects lessons learned from Ukraine, the Middle East and other recent conflicts where attritable, expendable systems have become decisive.
In early February 2026, the Pentagon named 25 companies to participate in this first phase, many of them smaller U.S. businesses rather than primes. The test campaign is designed to run in months, not years. Military operators will directly fly and evaluate candidate systems. Immediate prototype delivery orders are planned on the back end. (See Drone Dominance in AG News).
Beyond its military implications, Drone Dominance sends a clear industrial signal that the U.S. intends not only to protect its domestic drone market but to dominate production of tactical UAS for itself and its allies. For European defense contractors and dual-use startups, the program is both a competitor and a future buyer. Interoperability and political alignment will determine who can plug into that ecosystem.
Blue UAS Moves to DCMA: From List to Marketplace
Another important structural shift occurred in late 2025 when responsibility for the U.S. military’s Blue UAS Cleared List program was transferred from the Defense Innovation Unit (DIU) to the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA). What began as a relatively small, innovation-oriented vetting effort is being converted into a scaled, institutional procurement gateway under DCMA’s Special Programs Unmanned Systems–Experimental office.
All existing cleared platforms, recognized assessors and user communities moved with the program. A new portal is being built to serve as a single “trusted marketplace” for conforming UAS. This is more than an administrative reshuffle. It reflects the reality that compliant, secure small drones are becoming standard equipment, with dedicated budgeting, supplier relations and lifecycle management.
In the context of the FCC’s foreign drone restrictions, the Blue UAS ecosystem becomes even more important for European companies. Platforms on this list enjoy a privileged status, including exemptions from some of the harshest import controls and foreign manufacturers that can meet the criteria may retain or gain access to U.S. government markets, even as the general environment tightens.
Mobile No-Fly Zones: The FAA “Roving Bubbles” NOTAM
On the airspace management front, the FAA has begun to experiment with a novel and controversial tool: a NOTAM that attaches drone restrictions to people and vehicles rather than fixed geography. Issued in January 2026, the directive effectively forbids UAS within a defined lateral and vertical buffer around certain Department of Defense, Department of Homeland Security, and Department of Energy operations, including mobile convoys and maritime assets.
The problem is that the restricted airspace moves. A drone operator flying legally one moment can become non-compliant the next if a covered convoy drives underneath or nearby, with no real-time mechanism for the operator to know in advance. Combined with growing C-UAS authorities, this floating exclusion zone raises serious civil liberties and due-process concerns in the U.S., especially along sensitive border regions. (See AG coverage of NOTAM and civil liberties).
For European observers, the experiment is instructive. It reveals one path by which a state can extend protective bubbles around security operations in a highly dynamic way. It also exposes the risk of creating what operators see as “compliance traps,” where ignorance may be indistinguishable from intentional violation.
FAA’s “Hammer” Moment: Enforcement as the Default
Historically, the FAA has emphasized education and voluntary compliance for drone operators, reserving punitive measures for more egregious cases. That appears to be ending. A new enforcement order issued in early 2026 effectively makes legal action the default response in a broad category of UAS violations, particularly those involving danger to the public, breaches of restricted airspace or operations associated with other crimes.
The order instructs FAA personnel that cases fitting defined criteria must be referred for legal enforcement. Deviations from that path require explicit, high-level justification. Sanctions can include significant civil penalties and revocation of all airman certificates held by an individual. This reaches far beyond drone privileges alone. (See AG coverage of FAA enforcement shift).
When viewed together with the roving-bubble NOTAM and expanding C-UAS authority, the message to operators, domestic and foreign, is that the margin for error in U.S. skies is narrowing dramatically.
FAA Reorganized: Drones as Core Business, Not Side Project
Perhaps the most underappreciated development, especially from abroad, is the internal transformation of the FAA itself. In January 2026, the agency announced what it calls the largest reorganization in its history. It aligned its structure with a future in which advanced aviation technologies are not edge cases, but mainstream.
A new Office of Advanced Aviation Technologies, a dedicated top-level home for drones, advanced air mobility (AAM), and other emerging platforms, forms the core of these changes. Where UAS responsibilities were once scattered across multiple lines of business, the FAA has now consolidated them alongside eVTOLs and other next-generation systems under a leadership structure that reports at the highest levels.
In parallel, the FAA is standing up a unified, agency-wide Safety Management System organization to centralize risk analysis and safety data that were previously fragmented. Incidents involving drones, BVLOS trial data and integration challenges will now be evaluated within the same systemic framework as manned aviation events.
A third major pillar involves the Airspace Modernization office, tasked with planning and guiding a new generation of air traffic control infrastructure. UAS traffic management, data links, surveillance tools and automation are explicitly in scope. This signals that the architecture of the U.S. National Airspace System is being redesigned with uncrewed operations in mind from the outset.
For Europe, accustomed to seeing drones integrated through existing aviation institutions, the U.S. choice to create a dedicated advanced aviation structure is a noteworthy divergence. It suggests that Washington expects uncrewed and highly automated systems to be so central that they merit distinct bureaucratic weight, not just incremental adjustments to legacy departments.
Why This Matters Beyond U.S. Borders
Taken together, these moves amount to a significant strategic pivot. The United States is hardening its drone ecosystem along three prongs:
- Regulation and safety, through Part 108 and FAA structural reform.
- Security and sovereignty, through SAFER SKIES, the FCC foreign drone controls and an assertive counter-UAS posture.
- Industrial and military capability, through programs like Drone Dominance and the institutionalization of Blue UAS.
For non-U.S. audiences, this will shape what aircraft can be sold where, which platforms are deemed “trusted,” how shared airspace is managed at major international events and what interoperability looks like in joint operations. It also offers a preview of the kinds of compromises liberal democracies will make as they try to balance safety, privacy, innovation and national security in a sky increasingly populated by autonomous systems.
Europe will answer these questions in its own way, within its own legal and political constraints. Whether as competitor, partner, or both, the United States has set down markers for how a major aviation power intends to live with, and control, drones at scale.