By: Dawn Zoldi
Europe’s proposed “Drone Wall,” now increasingly referred to as the European Drone Defence Initiative (EDDI), reflects the new reality that cheap, commercially available drones that can be weaponized or repurposed for intelligence, surveillance, and disruption now contest the skies above the continent. In a recent analysis of Europe’s Drone Wall, Lior Mishan, Product Marketing lead for D-Fend Solutions, frames the initiative as a multilayered, interoperable shield inspired by lessons from modern conflict and hybrid warfare. His discussion emphasized the need for EU‑wide coordination and shared situational awareness, and integration at the command-and-control (C2) level to manage diverse drone categories. This article builds on that foundation by arguing that, within any such multilayered construct, the RF‑cyber layer should be treated as the primary component for Commercial and DIY (Group 1–2) drones, feeding into a broader C2 architecture.
The Rise of the Commercial and DIY Drone Threat
The most immediate and persistent danger Europe faces includes not only state‑operated combat drones at the high end of conflict, but also commercial and do-it-yourself (DIY) platforms. Easy to buy, easy to modify and hard to track quadcopters and small fixed‑wing systems, often sourced off the shelf (OTS) and adapted with open‑source flight controllers, provide adversaries with low‑signature options for reconnaissance, payload delivery or hybrid attacks.
Recent incidents across Europe, such as small drones detected over air bases, airports and critical facilities, demonstrate that these platforms can be used to probe defenses, map security patterns or interfere with operations…without ever crossing the threshold of a traditional battlefield.
For airports, power plants, government complexes, data centers and logistics hubs, this means that a Drone Wall built solely around kinetic effectors such as missiles, interceptor drones or guns will be not only expensive to sustain, but in many scenarios, operationally unnecessary or even inappropriate.
Many of these small threats can and should be neutralized by targeting the radio‑frequency (RF) communications that these commercial drones depend on to fly, navigate and communicate. This is possible because commercial and DIY drones generally operate over various RF bands. They may also rely on GNSS for positioning. A spectrum of non‑kinetic countermeasures, from jamming and disruption to more sophisticated, safe and surgical RF-Cyber takeover and safe‑landing techniques, when legal and technically feasible.
Despite this, early European counter‑UAS deployments have often emphasized hardware‑centric stacks. Those systems, which include radar for detection, cameras for identification,and broad‑spectrum jammers for mitigation, each have their place. However, they struggle in cluttered urban environments, around low‑flying small drones and in dense RF conditions where simple jamming risks collateral damage to communications and navigation systems.
The next phase of European counter‑UAS must therefore shift toward software‑centric, AI‑assisted operations, where a central platform fuses radar, RF, acoustic and electro‑optical inputs into a single coherent picture. On top of that fused data, machine‑learning models can help distinguish between benign recreational drones, authorized commercial platforms and potentially hostile actors based on flight behavior, RF signatures and contextual information. From there, operators can select proportionate responses, ranging from operator engagement and geofencing to highly targeted RF‑cyber countermeasures, reserving kinetic options for only the most severe or time‑critical threats.
Protecting Sensitive Civil Sites: The Soft Underbelly
This evolution is especially important in dual‑use environments where civil and military interests intersect. The same RF‑cyber core that could help defend military bases along Europe’s eastern flank can also underpin protection for civilian airports, energy infrastructure and major public events.
Sensitive but non‑military sites should be considered the soft underbelly of the Drone Wall concept, because they are difficult to protect with traditional air‑defense tools. Firing interceptors over a city or near a passenger terminal is not only politically fraught, it may also be operationally unacceptable due to safety and continuity concerns. In contrast, a layered RF‑cyber solution woven into perimeter security, optical cameras and other security systems can deliver a non‑kinetic first line of defense that aligns with public‑safety objectives, regulatory constraints and community expectations.
Consider a major European infrastructure site by way of illustration. An RF‑cyber‑centric counter‑UAS system could detect a rogue drone long before it enters the environment by recognizing its RF communications characteristics, then cross‑reference its presence with authorized drones and known operators. If the drone appears to be a consumer or commercial model flying without approval, the system could potentially first enable warnings and attempts to contact the operator when possible. It could then escalate to employ cyber techniques to redirect or safely land the drone outside critical zones if the behavior is non‑compliant. In the event of aggressive or clearly malicious behavior, such as rapid incursions into protected airspace, authorities could consider more intrusive or kinetic measures. This graduated, escalating software‑orchestrated approach preserves safety while maintaining operational continuity.
RF‑Cyber as a Software‑Centric “Digital Backbone” for Small Drones
Incorporating a software‑defined RF‑cyber core to function as the digital nervous system of small drone defense system provides several advantages, discussed below.
Cost‑effectiveness
While kinetic interceptors still have a role for high-end threats, authorities must factor asymmetry into the equation. Leveraging RF-cyber technology avoids the absurdity of using a high‑value interceptor to defeat a low‑cost quadcopter.
Precision and Safety
Non‑kinetic tools can target specific drones without generating shrapnel, debris or uncontrolled falls in complex environments, such as crowded urban areas or near manned aircraft. Using a software-defined RF-cyber core around sensitive sites,would integrate passive RF detection to sense and classify drone signals, flag suspicious drones, and then initiate cyber‑enabled response options to allow authorities to warn operators, deconflict legitimate flights or take control of threatening drones when legally authorized.
Scalability
Software‑driven systems can be updated as new commercial models, protocols and tactics emerge, without requiring the wholesale replacement of hardware. Additionally, rather than operating as isolated silos, these capabilities should feed into a common operating picture (COP) accessible to civil aviation authorities, security services and infrastructure operators. In that sense, the Drone Wall becomes a distributed, software‑defined shield stretching from national borders down to individual airports and industrial zones.
Toward a Smarter, Software‑Defined Drone Wall
As EU institutions and member states debate the architecture of this multilayered shield, the conversation must revolve around more than just hardware‑heavy interceptors. It must include a software‑centric, RF‑cyber core capable of managing commercial and DIY drone threats around sensitive sites and critical infrastructure.
In practice, that means viewing the Drone Wall not as a chain of independent hardware batteries, but as a software‑defined ecosystem spanning borders, agencies and sectors. Within that ecosystem, counter‑UAS providers with deep RF‑cyber and software expertise, such as D‑Fend Solutions’, become essential enablers, offering non‑kinetic, software‑centric capabilities that help protect sensitive sites and crowded airspace against small drone threats, without defaulting to high‑risk or high‑cost kinetic options, while preserving those options to use when necessary.
As debates continue over budgets, governance, and technical standards for Europe’s Drone Wall, the central question should shift away from how many hard‑kill systems can be deployed and toward how mission-optimized different layers can be implemented, with an intelligent, adaptable RF-cyber core managing small drone threats within a unified C2 umbrella. If Europe succeeds in building a Drone Wall whose foundation includes a flexible, software‑centric RF‑cyber architecture, it will gain not just another defense project, but a living, evolving shield capable of keeping pace with the rapid innovation cycle of commercial and DIY drones, while keeping its people, infrastructure, and airspace safer, in a world where even the smallest aircraft can have outsized impact.